small challenge given existing barriers of language, disciplinary orientation, and sheer distance. The participants in this symposium hail from varied jurisdictions-the United States, Europe, Korea, Australia-and bring to the subject a wide diversity of expertise and epistemological orientations, including law, computer science, science and technology studies, anthropology, cultural studies, and hacker culture.
Taken as a whole, the symposium first highlights the limits of existing frameworks and diagnoses some of the reasons for those limits. Legal scholar David Fidler chronicles international legal developments and the U.S. position on those developments in cases of internet freedom, cyberespionage, and cybersecurity. 3 Fidler is ultimately quite pessimistic about the strength and utility of existing international legal norms, and about their vitality in the face of the antipathy of the incoming Trump administration.
Computer scientist Fred Schneider describes the practical, political, and economic reasons why available state of the art technologies to defend against cyberattacks have not been, and are unlikely to be fully deployed. 4 He raises the very interesting question of trade-offs between the state's interest in protecting citizens and corporations against cyberattacks and the state's interest in surveillance of the same citizens, as well as others for national security reasons. 5 We (Johns and Riles), professors of law and Far East legal studies respectively, describe the limits of two key modalities of thinking about cybersecurity, which we term the "bunker" and the "vaccine." 6 In response, the symposium suggests several avenues for further research, policy consideration, and individual and community activism. Economist Sung-in Jun emphasizes the hybrid nature of the DNC hacking as both a matter of national security and a matter of personal privacy. 7 Jun suggests using tools from the law of property and privacy law to distinguish cases and guide moral judgment about proper responses. Yet he points out that there is a trade-off, again, between individuals' interest in privacy and corporations' interest in access to individual information and also governments' interest in surveillance. Niranjan Sivakumar, a lawyer, hacker, and science and technology studies scholar, looks to science and technology studies and hacker culture for a more participatory approach to cybersecurity. 8 He gives examples of collaboratively developed technological solutions that demonstrate the value of "nonhegemonic configurations of knowledge and power as a source of novel and creative contributions" to the problem. 9 Two of the contributions-ours and Sivakumar-propose conflict of laws or private international law frameworks as useful supplements to public international legal approaches. In Sivakumar's case, this is because the conflict of laws enables a more participatory process of norm development. In our account, private international law techniques suggest a way of thinking about cybersecurity that is more attuned to the entanglements that cyberthreats exploit, and the overlapping jurisdictions that may bear upon them.
Sivakumar ultimately suggests that hacker culture can serve as a model, or an analogue, for how policymakers and international lawyers might fashion new solutions to cybersecurity problems. The challenges of doing this-of learning laterally, across different genres of expertise, and of working effectively across existing linguistic, cultural, and geopolitical hierarchies and divides-are daunting. But in another sense this has always been the core mission of international law.
